Operational Surveillance Files of Affected Individuals

Operational proceedings concerning individuals invigilated or under surveillance had several levels of engagement, differing in means used, aims taken, and in the range of clandestine activity. The people affected were targeted (individually or as members of groups) for their ‘hostile activity’ (even if only suspected), former political engagements, former social class position, etc.

The operational proceedings were formally categorised in the ‘operational cases’ defined in the instructions for operational work (relevantly issued in 1945, 1955, 1960, 1970, and 1989 – see the downloadable edition of operational work instructions by Tadeusz Ruzikowski).

Prior to 1960, the general categories of operational cases were: sprawa agenturalnego sprawdzenia (agent verification case [to verify reliability of information on the given individual, development, or incident]), sprawa agenturalna na osobę (agent individual case [concerning the surveillance of an individual]), sprawa agenturalna grupowa (agent group case [concerning the surveillance of a group), sprawa agenturalno-śledcza (agent investigative case) and sprawa agenturalno-poszukiwawcza (agent search case [search for wanted persons). The term ‘agenturalny’, i.e. ‘agent’ meant the use of agents and informants [human intelligence – HUMINT] in the case. The instruction for the operational proceedings of 1960 introduced categories of operational proceedings: sprawa obserwacji operacyjnej (operational surveillance case), sprawa sprawdzenia operacyjnego (operational verification case), sprawa rozpracowania operacyjnego (operational surveillance case). The category sprawa obserwacji operacyjnej was replaced in 1966 with kwestionariusz ewidencyjny (registry form). The division introduced in 1970 followed the scheme developed in the 1960s, and used three simplified categories of operational proceedings and relevant cases: kwestionariusz ewidencyjny (registry form), the lowest level of operational engagement, launched to control persons under suspicion, sprawa operacyjnego sprawdzenia (operational verification case), the preliminary proceeding, launched in a case of suspicion or a presumed need for verification, sprawa operacyjnego rozpracowania (operational surveillance case), a procedure of the highest level of use of operational means, including the targeted use and acquisition of informants, the application of technical means of surveillance, street surveillance, clandestine postal interception, etc., to manipulate the persons affected (i.e. by provoking them, or setting up artificial situations in the course of a so-called kombinacja operacyjna, “combined operation” [a clandestine operation combining various resources, means or units to instigate a provocation or ‘sting’ operation].

The files were not divided into separate volumes in any specific manner (except for – in some instances only – separate volumes containing transcripts of tapped phone calls and copies of intercepted correspondence); they usually contained paperwork (forms) concerning the initiation, handover, and closing of the case, informants’ reports, notes of the case-officers concerning the persons under surveillance, operational activity plans, situation evaluations, surveillance reports, correspondence concerning the case, and so on.

In 1963, the specificity of Departament IV MSW (Department IV of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) work caused the emergence of special categories of case files that were conducted only in this unit, i.e. teczka ewidencji operacyjnej na księdza (case file of the operational registry concerning priests, TEOK), teczka ewidencji operacyjnej parafii (case file of the operational registry concerning parishes, TEOP), and teczka ewidencji operacyjnej na biskupa (case file of the operational registry concerning bishops, TEOB). However, the sheer majority of those case files were culled in 1989, and only a small number specimens remain.

Department I, the foreign intelligence unit, had its own categories of operational proceedings due to the nature of its dealings and the need to keep them in strict secrecy, even within the Ministry. For the same reasons, Department I ran its own separate archive and registry. The general categories of case files, introduced in the ’70s, were: teczka rozpracowania operacyjnego (the operational surveillance case file that covered individuals invigilated as well as the personal files of Department I agents and safe houses abroad), teczka rozpracowania obiektowego (the object surveillance case file) and podteczka rozpracowania obiektowego (the object surveillance case sub-file), which concerned the surveillance of groups, organisations, institutions, and similar, i.e. ‘objects,’ or comprised the documentation concerning a given matter or task; segregator materiałów wstępnych (preliminary materials binder, SMW) was a category of preliminary documentation gathering concerning persons that could possibly be recruited or put under surveillance.

The “reference no. IV” collection contained the files of the so-called ‘object’ and ‘thematic’ case files. These ‘object cases’ concerned institutions, companies, organisations, factories, etc., primarily after their recognition as “being in the nomenklatura” of specific levels of communist party structures (that is, being appointed to top positions in such places with the consent of the relevant Party committee), as well as those of the groups and organisations seen as the opposition. The aim of conducting of such cases was to ‘protect’ officially existing organisations, institutions, industrial plants, etc., from perceived foreign espionage, as well as internal subversion, sabotage, political dissent etc. Among the ‘objects’ were also targeted institutions not controlled by the communist state (i.a. diplomatic representations, Church institutions), and political opposition groups and circles. The ‘object’ case files were also started to gather operational information concerning public events (conferences, congresses, symposia, gatherings, etc.). The ‘object’ case files consist of ‘counterespionage profiles’ of the ‘objects,’ analyses of eventual threats to the ‘object,’ lists of the ‘suspected elements’ working or present in the ‘object,’ plans of operations conducted, copies of agent reports and other documentation of operations conducted.